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ABSTRACT 
In the American constitutional system the formal powers of 
government are sufficiently fragmented that no single official, 
including the president, is individually responsible for the outcomes 
of government activity. Thus, American officials face the continual 
temptation to "pass the buck"--to avoid any difficult or politically 
dangerous decision in the hope that some other official(s) will get 
stuck with the consequenc�s of acting or failing to act. The American 
citizen in turn, faces the difficult task of assessing responsibility 
on numerous officials all of whom deny that they share in that 
responsibility. The only remedy for such a situation is some form of 
collective responsibility by which all officials who share authority 
are held equally responsible for acting or failing to act. Thus far 
in our history the political party has been the only vehicle by which 
collective responsibility has been enforced. Strong parties provide 
the leadership to organized and maintain national policymaking coalitions, 
and in doing so become clearly responsible for the policies which emerge. 
Unfortunately, the political party has undergone a steady decline in 
American politics, a decline evident in the organizational, electoral 
and governmenta,l spheres. As a result there is a crisis of collective 
responsibility in contemporary American politics. This situation 
contributes to more often discussed contemporary problems such as 
immobilism in our policymaking processes, the increasing importance of 
single-issue groups, and the increasing political alienation of the 
American populace. 
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Though the Founding Fathers believed in the necessity of 
establishing a genuinely national government, they took great pains 
to design one which could not lightly do things to its citizens; 
what government might do for its citizens was to be limited to the 
functions of what we know now as the "watchman state." Thus, the 
Founders composed the constitutional litany familiar to every 
schoolchild: they created a federal system, they distributed and 
blended powers within and across the federal levels, and they 
encouraged the occupants of the various positions to check and 
balance each other by structuring incentives so that one officeholder's 
ambitions would be likely to conflict with others'. The resulting 
system of institutional arrangements predictably hampers efforts to 
undertake major initiatives and favors maintenance of the status �uo. 
Given the historical record faced by the Founders their 
emphasis on constraining government is understandable. But we face 
a later historical record, one which shows 200 years of increasing 
demands for government to act positively. Moreover, developments 
unforeseen by the Founders increasingly raise the likelihood that 
the uncoordinated actions of individuals and groups will inflict 
serious damage on the nation as a whole. The byproducts of the 
industrial and technological revolutions impose physical risks not 
only on us but on future generations as well. Resource shortages 
and international cartels raise the spectre of economic ruin. And 
the simple proliferation of special interests with their intense, 
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particularistic demands threatens to render us politically incapable 
of taking actions which might either advance the state of society 
on the one hand, or prevent foreseeable deteriorations in that state 
on the other, None of this is to suggest that we should forget about 
what government can do to us--the contemporary concern with the 
proper scope and methods of government intervention in the social 
and economic orders is long overdue. But the modern age demands as 
well that we worry about our ability to make government work for us. 
The problem is that we are gradually losing the ability 
to make government work for us. And a principal reason for this 
loss is the steady erosion of responsibility in American politics. 
What do I mean by this important quality, responsibility? 
To say that some person or group is responsible for a state of affairs 
is to assert that he/they have the ability to take legitimate actions 
which have a major impact on that state of affairs. More colloquially, 
when someone is responsible we know whom to blame. Human beings have 
asymmetric attitudes toward responsibility, as captured by the saying 
"success has a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan. " This 
general observation applies very much to politicians, not surprisingly, 
and this creates a problem for democratic theory, because clear 
location of responsibility is vitally important to the operation of 
democratic governments. Without responsibility citizens can only 
' ' 
' \  
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guess at who deserves their support; the act of voting loses much of 
its meaning. Moreover, the expectation of being held responsible 
provides representatives with a personal incentive to govern in 
t,heir constituents' interest. As ordinary citizens we do not know 
the proper rate of growth of the money supply, the appropriate level 
of the federal deficit, the advantages of the MX over alternative 
missile systems and so forth. We elect people to make those decisions. 
But only if those elected know that they will be held accountable for 
the results of their decisions (or nondecisions as the case may be) 
do they have a personal incentive to govern in our interest. 1 
Unfortunately, the impo�tance of responsibility in a 
democracy is matched by the difficulty of attaining it. In an 
, ,autocracy individual responsible suffices; the location of power in 
a single individual locates responsibility in that individual as well. 
But individual responsibility is insufficient whenever more than 
one person shares governmental authority. We can hold a particular 
congressman individually responsible for a personal transgression 
such as bribe-taking. We can even hold a President individually 
responsible for military moves where he presents Congress and the 
citizenry with a fait accompli. But on most national issues 
individual responsibility is difficult to assess. If one were to 
go to Washington, randomly accost a Democratic Congressman, and 
berate him about a 20 percent rate of inflation, imagine the response. 
More than likely it would run "Don't blame me, if ' they' had done what 
I've advocated for years, things would be fine today. " And if one 
were to walk over to the White House. and similarly confront Carter, 
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he would respond as he already has, by blaming Arabs, free-spending 
congressmen, special interests and of course, us. 
American institutional structure makes this kind of game-
playing all too easy. In order to overcome it we must lay the credit 
or blame for national conditions on all those who had any hand in 
bringing them about: some form of collective responsibility is 
essential. 
The only way collective responsibility has ever existed 
and can exist given our institutions is through the agency of the 
political party; in American politics responsibility requires 
cohesive parties. This is an old claim to be sure, but its age 
2 does not detract from its present relevance. In fact, the continuing 
decline in public esteem for the parties, and continuing efforts to 
"reform" them out of the political process suggest that old 
arguments for party responsibility have not been made often enough, 
or at least convincingly enough, so I will make these arguments once 
again in this essay. 
A strong political party can generate collective responsibility 
by creating incentives for leaders, followers and popular supporters to 
think and act in collective terms. First, by providing party leaders 
with the capability (e.g. control of institutional patronage, nominations, 
etc. ) to discipline party members, genuine leadership becomes possible. 
Legislative output is less likely to be a least common denominator--a 
residue of myriad conflicting proposals--and more likely to consist of 
a program actually intended to solve a problem or move the nation in a 
particular direction. Second, the subordination of individual office-
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holders to the party lessens their ability to separate themselves from 
party actions. Like it or not their performance becomes identified 
with the performance of the collectivity to which they belong. Third, 
with individual candidate variation greatly reduced, voters have less 
incentive to support individuals and more to support or oppose the 
party as a whole. And fourth, the circle closes as party line voting 
in the electorate provides party leaders with the incentive to propose 
policies which will earn the support of a national majority, and party 
back-benchers with the personal incentive to cooperate with leaders 
in the attempt to compile a good record for the party as a whole. 
In the American context strong parties have traditionally 
clarified politics in two ways. First, they allow citizens to assess 
responsibility easily, at least when the government is unified, which 
it more often was in earlier eras when party meant more than it does 
3 today. Citizens need only evaluate the social, economic and 
'international conditions they observe and make a simple decision for or 
�gainst change. They do not need to decide whether the energy, inflation, 
urban, and defense policies advocated by their congressman would be 
superior to those advocated by Carter--were any of them to be enacted! 
The second way in which strong parties clarify American 
politics follows from the first. When citizens assess responsibility 
on the party as a whole, party members have personal incentives to see 
the party evaluated favorably. They have little to gain from gutting 
their President's program one day then attacking him for lack of 
leadership the next, since they share in the President's fate when 
voters do not differentiate within the party. Put simply, party 
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responsibility provides party members with a personal stake in their 
collective perfonnance, 
Admittedly, party responsibility is a blunt instrument. 
The objection inunediately arises that party responsibility condemns 
junior Democratic representatives to suffer electorally for an inflation 
which they could do little to affect. An unhappy situation, true, 
but unless we accept it, Congress as a whole escapes electoral 
retribution for an inflation they could have done something to affect. 
Responsibility requires acceptance of both conditions. The choice is 
between a blunt instrument or none at all. 
Of course, the United States is not Great Britain. We 
have neither the institutions nor the traditions to support a 
British brand of responsible party government, and I do not see 
either the possibility or the necessity for such a system in 
America. In the past the United States has enjoyed eras in which 
party was a much stronger force than today. And until recently--a 
generation roughly--parties have provided an "adequate" degree of 
collective responsibility. They have done so by connecting the 
electoral fates of party members, via presidential coattails, 
for example, and by transforming elections into referenda on party 
performance, as with congressional off-year elections. 
In earlier times, when citizens voted for the party not 
the person, parties had incentives to nominate good candidates 
because poor ones could have hannful fallout on the ticket as a 
whole. 4 In particular, the existence of presidential coattails
(positive and negative) provided an inducement to avoid the 
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nomination of narrowly-based candidates, no matter how connnitted 
their supporters. And once in office, the existence of party 
voting in the electorate provided party members with the incentive 
to compile a good party record. In particular, the tendency of 
national midterm elections to serve as referenda on the performance 
of the President provided a clear inducement for congressmen to do 
what they could to see that their President was perceived as a solid 
performer. By stimulating electoral phenomena such as coattail 
effects and midterm referenda, party transformed some degree of 
personal ambition into concern with collective performance. 
In the contemporary period, however, even the preceding 
tendencies toward collective responsibility have largely dissipated. 
As background for a discussion of this contemporary weakening of 
collective responsibility and its deleterious consequences, let us 
briefly review the evidence for the decline of party in America. 
THE CONTINUING DECLINE OF PARTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Party is a simple term which covers a multitude of 
complicated organizations and processes, Party manifests itself 
most concretely as the set of party organizations which exist 
principally at the state and local levels, Party manifests itself 
most elusively as a psychological presence in the mind of the citizen. 
Somewhere in between and partly a function of the first two is the 
manifestation of party as a force in government. The discussion 
in this section will hold to this traditional schema, though it is 
clear that the three aspects of party have important interconnections. 
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Party Organizations 
In the United States party organization has traditionally 
meant state and local party organization. The national party 
generally has been a loose confederacy of subnational units which 
swings into action for a brief period every four years. This 
characterization remains true today, despite the somewhat greater 
5 influence and augmented functions of the national organizations. 
Though such things are difficult to measure precisely, there is 
general agreement that the formal party organizations have undergone 
a secular decline since their peak at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The prototype of the old style organization was the urban 
machine, a form approximated today only in Chicago. 
Several long-term trends have served to undercut old-style 
party organizations. The patronage system has been steadily chopped 
back since passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883. The social 
welfare functions of the parties have passed to the government as 
the modern welfare state developed. And less concretely, the entire 
ethos of the old-style party organization has become increasingly at 
odds with modern ideas of government based on rational expertise. 
These long-term trends spawned specific attacks on the old party 
organizations. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the Populists, Progressives and assorted other reformers fought 
electoral corruption with the Australian Ballot and personal 
registration systems. They attempted to break the hold of the party 
bosses over nominations by mandating the Direct Primary. They 
attacked the urban machines with drives for nonpartisan at-large 
elections and nonpartisan city managers, None of these reforms 
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destroyed the parties; they managed to live with the ref0rms better 
than most reformers had hoped. But the reforms both reflected 
changing popular attitudes towards the parties, and accelerated the 
secular decline in the influence of the party organizations. 
The New Deal period temporarily arrested the deterioration 
of the party organizations, at least on the Democratic side. Unified 
party control under a "political" President provided favorable 
6 conditions for the state and local organizations. But following 
the heyday of the New Deal (and ironically in part because of 
government assumption of subnational parties' functions) the decline 
continued. 
In the 1970s two series of reforms further weakened the 
influence of organized parties in American national politics. The 
first was a series of legal changes deliberately intended to lessen 
organized party influence in the Presidential nominating process. 
In the Democratic party "New Politics" activists captured the national 
'party apparatus, and imposed a series of rules changes designed to 
"open up" the politics of Presidential nominations. The Republican 
party--long more amateur and open than the Democrats--adopted weaker 
versions of the Democratic rules changes. In addition, modifications 
of state electoral laws to conform to the Democratic rules changes 
(enforced by the federal courts) stimulated Republican rules changes 
as well. Table 1 shows that the Presidential nominating process has 
[Table 1 here] 
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1968 
1972 
197 6  
1980 
Table 1 
Recent Changes in Presidential Nomination Process 
Number of States 
Holding Primaries 
17 
23 
30 
36 
Percentage of Delegates 
Selected in Primaries 
Democratic Republican 
38 34 
61 53 
73 68 
7 6  7 6  
Source: 1968-197 6  figures from Austin Ranney, "The Political Parties: 
Reform and Decline, "  in Anthony King (ed.), The New American 
Political System (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 
1978), Table 6-1. 1980 figures from National Journal, October 
20, 1979, 1738-1739. 
indeed been opened up. In little more than a decade after the 
disastrous 1968 Democratic conciave, the number of primary states has 
more than doubled and the number of delegates chosen in primaries has 
increased from little more than a third to three-quarters. Moreover, 
the remaining delegates emerge from caucuses far more open to mass 
citizen participation than previously, and the delegates themselves 
7 are more likely to be amateurs than previously. For example, in the 
four conventions from 1956 to 1968 more than 70 percent of the 
Democratic party's Senators, 40 percent of their Representatives, 
and 80 percent of their governors attended. In 1976 the figures were 
8 18 percent, 15 percent, and 47 percent respectively. Today's youth 
can observe the back room maneuvers of party bosses and favorite 
sons only by watching The Best Man on late night TV. 
A second series of 1970s reforms lessened the role of 
formal party organizations in the conduct of political campaigns. 
These are financing regulations growing out of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974 and 1976. In this case the 
reforms were aimed at cleaning up corruption in the financing of 
campaigns; their effects on the parties were a by-product, though 
many individuals accurately predicted the nature of the by-product. 
Serious presidential candidates are now publicly financed. Though 
the law permits the national party to spend two cents per eligible 
voter on behalf of the nominee, it also obliges the candidate to 
set up a finance committee separate from the national party. Between 
this legally mandated separation and fear of violating spending 
limits, accounting regulations, etc. the law has the effect of 
9 encouraging the candidate to keep his party at arm's length. 
At the present time only presidential candidates enjoy 
public financing. But a series of new limits on contributions and 
12 
expenditures affects other national races. Prior to the implementation· 
of the new law data on congressional campaign financing was highly 
unreliable, but consider some of the trends which have emerged only 
in the short time the law has been in effect. Table 2 shows the 
diminished role of the parties in the financing of congressional races. 
[Table 2 here] 
In House races the decline in the party proportion of funding has been 
made up by the generosity of the political action committees (also 
stimulated by the new law). In the Senate personally wealthy 
candidates appear to have picked up the slack left by the diminished 
party role. The party funding contribution in congressional races 
has declined not only as a proportion of the total, but also in 
absolute dollars, and considerably in inflation-adjusted dollars. 
The limits in the new law restrict the House candidates to no more 
than $15,000 in funding from each of the national and relevant state 
party (the average campaign expenditure of an incumbent in 1978 was 
about $121,000; of a challenger, about $54,000) . Senators are 
permitted to receive a maximum of $17,500 from their Senatorial 
Campaign Committee, plus two cents per eligible voter from the national 
committee and a like amount from the relevant state committee 
(twenty-one Senatorial candidates spent over a million dollars in 
1978). 
There is no detailed work on the precise effects of the 
contribution limits, but it appears doubtful that they are 
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Table 2 
Recent Sources of Congressional Campaign Contributions 
HOUSE 
Year Individual PACS Parties Personal 
1972 59% 14 17 NA 
1978 57 25 7 11 
SENATE 
Year 
1972 67 12 14 1 
1978 70 13 6 11 
Source: Michael Malbin, "Of Mountains and Molehills: PACs, Campaigns, 
and Public Policy," in Malbin (ed. ) ,  Parties, Interest Groups, 
and Campaign Finance Laws (Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1980), Table 1. 
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binding. If the national party were to contribute $15,000 to each 
of its congressional candidates, and a flat $17,500 to each of its 
senatorial candidates, that would be more than $8,000,000, All 
levels of the parties contributed only $10, 5 million of the $157 
millon spent in 1978 congressional races. Probably more constraining 
than limits on what the parties can contribute to the candidates are 
limits on what citizens and groups can contribute to the parties. 
Under current law individual contributors may given $1,000 per 
election to a candidate (primary, runoff, general election) , $5,000 
per year to a political action committee, and $20,000 per year to 
a party. From the standpoint of the law each of the two great 
national parties is the equivalent of four PACs. The PACs themselves 
are limited to a $15,000 per year contribution to the national party. 
Thus, financial angels are severely restricted, They 
must spread contributions around to individual candidates, each of 
whom is likely to regard the contribution as an expression of 
personal worthiness, and if anything, as less reason than ever to 
think in terms of the party. 
The ultimate results of such reforms are easy to predict. 
A lesser party role in the nominating and financing of candidates 
encourages candidates to organize independent campaigns. And 
independent conduct of campaigns only further weakens the role of 
parties. Of course, party is not the entire story in this regard. 
Other modern day changes contribute to the diminished party role in 
campaign politics. For one thing, party foot soldiers are no longer 
so important given the existence of a large leisured middle class 
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which participates out of duty, enjoyment, or whatever, but which 
participates on behalf of candidates and issues rather than parties. 
Similarly, contemporary campaigns rely heavily on modern technology--
survey research, the mass media, and modern advertising methods--which 
is provided by independent con'sultants outside the formal party 
apparatus. Although these developments are not directly related to 
the contemporary reforms, their effect is the same: the dimunition 
of the role of parties in conducting political campaigns. And if 
parties do not grant nominations, fund their choices, and work for 
them, why should those choices feel any commitment to their party? 
Party in the Electorate 
In the citizenry at large, party takes the form of a 
psychological attachment. The typical American traditionally has been 
likely to identify with one or the other of the two major parties. 
Such identifications are transmitted across generations to some 
10 degree, and within the individual they tend to be fairly stable, 
But there is mounting evidence that the basis of identification lies 
in the individual's experiences (direct and vicarious through family 
11 and social groups) with the parties in the past. Our current party 
system, of course is based on the dislocations of the Depression 
period and the New Deal attempts to alleviate them. Though only a 
small proportion of those who experienced the Depression directly 
are active voters today, the general outlines of citizen party 
identifications much resemble those established at that time. 
Again, there is reason to believe that the extent of 
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citizen attachments to parties has undergone a long-term decline 
from a late nineteenth century high.12 And again, the New Deal
appears to have been a period during which the decline was arrested, 
even temporarily reversed. But again, the decline of party has 
reasserted itself in the decade of the 1970s. 
Since 1952 the Center for Political Studies at the 
University of Michigan has conducted regular national election 
surveys. The data elicited in such studies gives us a graphic picture 
of the state of party in the electorate, Consider Table 3. As the 
[Table 3 here] 
1960s wore on, the heretofore stable distribution of citizen party 
identifications began to change in the general direction of weakened 
attachments to the parties. Between 1960 and 1976 independents, 
broadly defined, increased from less than a quarter to more than a 
third of the voting age population. Strong identifiers declined 
from slightly more than a third to about a quarter of the population. 
As the strength and extent of citizen attachments to the 
parties declined, the influence of party on the voting decisions of 
the citizenry similarly declined. The percent of the voting age 
population which reports consistent support of the same party's 
presidential candidate drops from more than two-thirds in 1952 to 
less than half in 1976. As Table 4 shows, the percent of voters who 
report a congressional vote consistent with their party identification 
has declined from over 80 percent in the late 1950s to under 70 
percent today. And as Table 5 shows, ticket splitting, both at the 
national and subnational levels has probably doubled since the time 
of the first Eisenhower election. 
17 
Table 3 
Subjective Party Identification, 1960-1976 
Party ID 1960 1964 1968 197 2  1976 
Strong Democrat 21% 27 20 15 15 
Weak Democrat 25 25 25 26 25 
Independent Democrat 8 8 9 10 12 
Independent 8 8 11 13 14 
Independent Republican 7 6 9 11 10 
Weak Republican 13 13 14 13 14 
Strong Republican 14 11 10 10 9 
Source: National Election Studies made available by the InterUniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of 
Michigan. 
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[Table 4 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
Indisputably, party in the electorate has declined in recent 
years. Why? To some extent the electoral decline results from the 
organizational decline. Few party organizations any longer have the 
tangible incentives to turn out the faithful and assure their loyalty. 
Candidates run independent campaigns and deemphasize their partisan 
ties whenever they see any short-term electoral gain in doing so. 
And if party is increasingly less important in the nomirtation and 
election of candidates, it is not surprising that such diminished 
importance is reflected in the attitudes and behavior of the voter. 
Certain long-term sociological and technological trends 
also appear to work against party in the electorate. The population 
is younger, and younger citizens traditionally are less attached to 
the parties than their elders. The population is more highly 
educated; fewer voters need some means of simplifying the choices 
they face in the political arena, and party, of course, has been the 
principal means of simplification. And finally, the media revolution 
has vastly expanded the amount of information easily available to 
the citizenry. Candidates would have little incentive to operate 
campaigns independent of the parties if there were no means to apprise 
the citizenry of their independence. The media provide the means. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, our present party system is 
an old one. For increasing numbers of citizens, party attachments 
based on the Great Depression, seem lacking in relevance to the 
problems of the late twentieth century. Beginning with the racial 
issue in the 1960s, proceeding to the social issue of the 1970s, and 
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Table 4 
Percentage Party-Line Votes in House Elections 
Year Percentage 
1956 82% 
1958 84 
1960 80 
1962 83 
1964 79 
1966 76 
1968 74 
1970 7 6  
1972 73 
1974 74 
197 6  7 2  
1978 69 
Source: National Election Studies made available by The InterUniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of 
Michigan. 
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Table 5 
Trends in Ticket Splitting, 1952-1976 
President/House State/Local 
1952 12% 34 
1956 16 42 
1960 14 46 
1964 15 42 
1968 18 48 
1972 30 54 
1976 25 
Source: National Election Studies made available by The InterUniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan. 
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to the energy, environment and inflation issues of today, the parties 
have been rent by internal dissension. Sometimes they failed to take 
stands, at other times they took the wrong ones from the standpoint 
of the rank and file, and at most times they have failed to solve 
the new problems in any genuine sense. Since 1965 the parties have 
done little or nothing to earn the loyalties of modern Americans. 
Party in Government 
If the organizational capabilities of the parties have 
weakened, and their psychological ties to the voters have loosened, 
one would expect predictable consequences for the party in 
government. In particular, one would expect to see an increasing 
degree of split party control within and across the levels of 
American government. The evidence on this point is overwhelming. 
At the state level twenty-seven of the fifty governments 
were under divided party control after the 1978 election. In 
seventeen states a governor of one party opposed a legislature 
controlled by the other, and in ten other states a bicameral 
legislature was split between the parties, By way of contrast, 
twenty years ago the number of states with divided party control 
was sixteen. 
At the federal level the trend is similar. In 1953 only 
twelve states sent a U. S. Senator of each party to Washington. The 
number increased to sixteen by 1961, to twenty-one by 1972 and 
stands at twenty-seven today. Of course, the $enators in each state 
are elected at different times. But the same patterns emerge when 
we examine simultaneous elections. Consider the increasing tendency 
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for congressional districts to support a congressman of one party 
and the presidential candidate of the other (Table 6). At the turn 
[Table 6 here] 
of the century it was extremely rare for a congressional district to 
report a split result. But since the 1940s the trend has been 
steadily upward. We may well be heading for a record in 1980 as a 
vulnerable Democratic President runs with 250-odd not-so-vulnerable 
Democratic congressmen. 
Seemingly unsatisfied with the increasing tendencies of 
the voters to engage in ticket-splitting, we have added to the split 
of party in government by changing electoral rules in a manner which 
lessens the impact of national forces. For example, in 1920 thirty-
five states elected their legislators, governors and other state 
officials in presidential election years. In 1944 thirty-two states 
still did so. But in the past generation the trend has been 
toward isolation of state elections from national currents: as of 
1970 only twenty states still held their elections concurrently with 
the national ones,13' This legal separation of the state:.and national 
electoral arenas helps to separate the electoral fates of party 
officeholders at different levels of government, and thereby lessens 
their connnon interest in a good party record. 
The increased fragmentation of the party in government makes 
it more difficult for government officeholders to work together than 
in times past (not that it has ever been terribly easy). Voters 
meanwhile have a more difficult time attributing responsibility for 
government performance, and this only further fragments party control. 
The result is lessened collective responsibility in the system. 
23 
Table 6 
Split Results, Congress and President 
Year Percentage of Districts 
1900 3% 
1908 7 
1916 11 
1924 12 
1932 14 
1940 15 
1948 23 
1956 30 
1964 33 
1972 42 
1980 ? 
Source: The 1900-1968 figures are from Walter Dean Burham, Critical 
Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics (New York: 
Norton, 1970), p. 109. The 1972 figures are from Congressional 
Quarterly's compilation of official election returns. 
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In recent years it has become a commonplace to bemoan the 
decline of party in government. National commentators nostalgically 
contrast the Senate under Lyndon Johnson with that under Robert Byrd. 
They deplore the cowardice and paralysis of a House of Representatives 
supposedly controlled by a two-thirds Democratic majority under the 
most activist, partisan speaker since Sam Rayburn. And, of course 
there are the unfavorable comparisons of Jimmy Carter to previous 
Presidents--not only FDR and LBJ, but even Kennedy. Such observations 
may be descriptively accurate but they are not very illuminating. It 
is not enough to call for more inspiring presidential leadership and 
to demand that the majority party in Congress show more readiness to 
bite the bullet. our present national problems should be recognized 
as the outgrowths of the increasing separation of the presidential 
and congressional electoral arenas, 
By now it is widely understood that senatorial races are 
in a class by themselves. The visibility of the office attracts the 
attention of the media as well as that of organized interest groups. 
Celebrities and plutocrats find the office attractive. And so, massive 
media campaigns and the politics of personality increasingly affect the 
senatorial voting. Senate elections now are most notable for their 
idiosyncracy, and consequentially for their growing volatility; 
correspondingly, such general forces as the President and the party are 
less influential in the senatorial voting today than previously. 
What is less often recognized is that House elections have 
grown increasingly idiosyncratic as well. I have already discussed 
the declining importance of party identification in House voting, 
and the increasing number of split results at the district level, 
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These trends are both cause and consequence of incumbent efforts to 
insulate themselves from the electoral effects of national conditions. 
Consider Figure 1. This figure shows the distribution of the vote 
garnered by the Democratic candidate in incumbent-contested districts 
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in 1948 and 1972. Evidently, a massive change took place in the 
[Figure 1 here] 
past generation. Whereas in 1948 most congressional districts were 
clustered around the 50 percent mark (an even split between the 
parties) , most districts now are clustered away from the point of 
equal division. Two obvious questions arise: why has the change 
occurred, and does it matter? 
Taking�the second question first, Figure 1 suggests a bleak 
future for such electoral phenomena as Presidential coattails and midterm 
referenda on presidential performance. Consider a swing of 5 percent 
in the congressional vote owing to a particularly attractive or 
repulsive presidential candidate, or an especially poor performance 
by a President. In the world represented by the 1948 diagram such 
a swing has major consequences: it shifts a large proportion of 
districts across the 50 percent mark. The shift provides a new 
President with a "mandate" in an on-year election, and.constitutes 
a strong "message" to the President in an off-year election. In 
the world represented by the 1972 diagram, however, the hypothesized 
5 percent shift has little effect: few seats are close enough to 
the tipping point to shift parties under the hypothesized swing. 
The President's victory is termed a "personal" victory by the media, 
or the midterm result is interpreted as a reflection of personal 
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and local concerns rather than national ones. 
Why has the distribution of the congressional voting 
results changed form over time? Elsewhere I have argued that much of 
the transformation results from a temporal change in the basis of 
15 congressional voting. We have seen that party influence in House 
voting has lessened. And judging by the number of Democrats 
successfully hanging on to traditionally Republican districts, 
programmatic and ideological influences on House voting probably have 
declined as well. And what has taken up the slack left by the 
weakening of the traditional determinants of congressional voting? 
It appears that a variety of personal and local influences now play a 
16 major role in citizen evaluations of their Representatives. Along 
with the expansion of the federal presence in American life the 
traditional role of the congressman as an all-purpose ombudsman has 
greatly expanded. Tens of millions of citizens now are directly 
affected by federal decisions. Myriad programs provide opportunities 
to profit from government largesse, and myriad regulations impose 
costs and/or constraints on citizen activities. And whether seeking 
to gain prof it or avoid costs citizens seek the aid of their 
congressmen. When a Court imposes a desegregation plan on an urban 
school board, the congressional offices immediately are contacted 
both for aid in safeguarding existing sources of funding and for aid 
in determining eligibility for new ones. When a major employer 
announces plans to quit an area the congressional offices immediately 
are contacted to explore possibilities for using federal programs to 
persuade the employer to reconsider. Contractors appreciate a good 
congressional word with DOD procurement officers. Local artistic 
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groups can not survive without NEA funding. And of course, there are 
the major individual programs such as social security and veterans' 
benefits, which create a steady demand for congressional information 
and aid services. Such activities are nonpartisan, nonideological, and 
most importantly, noncontroversial. Moreover the contribution of 
the congressman in the realm of district service appears considerably 
greater than the impact of his or her single vote on major national 
issues, Constitutents respond rationally to this modern state of 
affairs by weighing nonprogrammatic constituency service heavily 
when casting their congressional votes. And this emphasis on the 
part of constituents provides the means for incumbents to solidify 
their hold on the office. Even if elected by a narrow margin, 
diligent service activities enable a congressman to neutralize or 
even convert a portion of those who would otherwise oppose him on 
policy or ideological grounds. Emphasis on local, nonpartisan 
factors in congressional voting enables the modern congressman to 
withstand national swings whereas yesteryear's uninsulated congressman 
were more dependent on preventing the occurrence of the swings. 
Actually, the insulation of the modern congressman from 
national forces is even more complete than the preceding discussion 
suggests. Not only are few representatives so vulnerable that a 
reaction to a presidential candidate or his performance would turn 
them out of office, but such reactions themselves are less 'likely 
to find a reflection in the congressional voting. Several years ago 
Professor Edward Tufte formulated an elegant statistical model which 
predicts the magnitude of the in-party's losses in midterm elections 
as a function of two variables, the popularity of the incumbent 
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President, and the state of the national economy as measured by changes 
in real income. 17 For most of the post-World War II period the model
predicts quite accurately. But in recent years the predictions have 
'begun to go awry; specifically, in 1974 and 1978 the model significantly 
' 18 ·over-predicts the losses of the in-party. The reason is quite apparent. 
As congressmen increasingly build personal organizations (largely
with taxpayer provided offices, staff, and communications resources)
and base their campaigns on local issues and their personal record
of service to the district, national conditions and the performance
of the party leader have less and less of an impact on House races, 
In fact, analysis of the 1978 Center for Political Studies
Congressional Election Study reveals that evaluations of Carter's
perfonnance had no effect on the electoral fortunes of Democratic 
incumbents, and citizen evaluations of government's handling of the 
19 national economy had only the barest trace of an impact. 
The effects of the insulation of congressional incumbents 
�ave begun to show up in a systematic way in the governmental arena. 
rable 7 presents data on presidential success and presidential 
gupport in Congress for the first two years of the administrations 
of our last five elected Presidents. As is evident Carter was less 
[Table 7 here] 
successful than earlier Presidents who enjoyed a Congress controlled 
by their own party; he was only as successful as Nixon who faced an 
opposition Congress, Moreover, in the House Carter has done 
relatively poorly in gaining the support of his own party colleagues. 
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Table 7 
Recent Trends in Congressional Support of the Executive 
Congress Year 
83rd '53-54 
87th '61-62 
89th '65-66 
9lst '69-70 
95th 17 7-78 
Pre�idential 
Success 
83% 
83 
87 
7 6  
7 7  
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 
Presidential Support 
Within His Party 
House Senate 
72 72 
73 64 
69 61 
62 63 
61 67  
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It is noteworthy that Kennedy earned a significantly higher level of 
support from a congressional party that was nearly half Southern 
whereas Carter enjoyed a majority in which the regional split was 
much less severe. 20
Of course, it is possible to discount the preceding 
argument as an unjustified generalization of a unique situation--a 
particularly inept President, a Congress full of prima donnas still 
flexing their post-Watergate muscles, etc. But I think not. The 
withering away of the party organizations and the weakening of party 
in the electorate have begun to show up as disarray in the party in 
government. As the electoral fates of congressmen and the President 
have diverged, their incentives to cooperate have diverged as well. 
Congressmen have little personal incentive to bear risks in their 
President's behalf since they no longer expect to gain much from his 
successes or suffer much from his failures. Those who personally 
agree with the President's program and/or those who find that 
program well-suited for their particular district support the 
President, but there are not enough of them to construct the 
coalitions necessary for action on the major issues now facing the 
country. By holding only the President responsible for national 
conditions the electorate enables officialdom as a whole to escape 
responsibility. This situation lies at the root of many of the 
problems which now plague American public life. 
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECLINE OF COLLECTIVE REPONSIBILITY 
The weakening of party has contributed directly to the 
severity of several of the important problems the nation faces. For 
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some of these, such as the government's inability to deal with 
inflation and energy, the connections are obvious. But for other 
problems, such as the growing importance of single-issue politics, 
and the growing alienation of the American citizenry, the connections 
are more subtle. 
Immobilism 
As the electoral interdependence of the party in government 
declines, its ability to act also declines. If responsibility can 
be shifted to another level or to another officeholder, there is less 
incentive to stick one's own neck out in an attempt to solve a given 
problem, Leadership becomes more difficult, the ever-present bias 
toward the short-term solution becomes more pronounced, and the 
possibility of solving any given problem lessens. 
Consider the two critical problems facing the country 
today, energy and inflation. Major energy problems were forecast 
years ago, the 1973 embargo underlined the dangers, and yet what 
passes for our national energy policy is still only a weak set of 
jerry-built compromises achieved at the expense of years of political 
infighting. The related inflation problem has festered for more than 
a decade, and our current President is on his fourth anti-inflation 
plan, a set of proposals widely regarded as yet another instance of 
too little, too late. The failures of policymaking in these areas 
are easy to identify and explain. A potential problem is identified 
and actions which might head it off are proposed "for discussion." 
But the problem lies in the future, while the solutions impose costs 
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in the present. So politicians dismiss the solutions as infeasible, 
and act as though the problem will go away. When it doesn't, popular 
concern increases. The President, in particular, feels compelled to 
act--he will be held responsible, both at election time and in the 
judgment of history. But congressmen expect to bear much less 
responsibility; moreover, the Representatives face an election in 
less than two years, whereas the President can wait at least four 
(longer for the lame duck) for the results of his policy to become 
evident. Congressmen, logically enough, rebel. They denounce every 
proposed initiative as unfair, which simply means that it imposes 
costs on their constituents whereas they prefer the costs to fall 
on everyone else's constituents. At first, no policy will be 
adopted; later, as pressure builds, Congress adopts a weak and 
ineffectual policy for symbolic purposes. Then, as the problem 
continues to worsen, congressmen join with the press and the public 
and attack the President for failures of leadership. 
The preceding scenario is simplified, to be sure, but 
largely accurate, and in my personal opinion, rather disgusting. 
What makes it possible is the electoral fragmentation produced by 
the decline of party. Members of Congress are aware that national 
problems arising from inaction will have little political impact on 
them, and that the President's failures in dealing with those 
problems will have similarly little impact. Responsibility for 
inflation and energy problems? Don't look at congressmen. 
In 1958 the French Fourth Republic collapsed after years 
of immobilism. The features of congressional policy making just 
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discussed were carried to their logical extremes in that Parliamentary 
regime. According to contemporary observers the basic principle of 
21 the French Deputy was to avoid responsibility. To achieve that 
goal the deputies followed subsidiary rules, the most important of 
which was delay. Action would take place only when crisis removed 
any possible alternative to action (and most of the alternative 
actions as well) . A slogan of the time was "Those who crawl do not 
fall. " 
No one seriously believes that the American constitutional 
order is in danger of collapse (and certainly we have no De Gaulle 
waiting in the wings) , But political inability to take actions which 
entail short run costs ordinarily will result in much higher costs 
in the long run--we can not continually depend on the technological 
fix. So the present American immobilism should not be dismissed lightly. 
The sad thing is that the American people appear to understand the 
depth of our present problems and at least in principle appear 
prepared to sacrifice in furtherance of the long-run good, But they 
will not have an opportunity to choose between two or more such 
long-term plans. For although both parties promise tough, equitable 
policies, in the present state of our politics neither can deliver. 
Single Issue Politics 
In recent years both political analysts and politicans have 
decried the increased importance of single issue groups in American 
politics, Some in fact would claim that the present immobilism in 
our politics owes more to the rise of single issue groups than to 
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the decline of party. A little thought, however, should reveal that 
the two trends are connected. ls si.ngle issue politics a 
recent phenomenon? The contention is doubtful; such groups have 
always been active participants in American politics. The gun lobby 
already was a classic example at the time of President Kennedy's 
assassination, And however impressive the anti-abortionists appear 
today, remember the temperance movement which in fact succeeded in 
getting its constitutional amendment. American history contains 
numberous forerunners of today's groups, from anti-Masons to 
abolitionists to the Klan--singularity of purpose is by no means a 
modern phenomenon. Why then do we hear all the contemporary hoopla 
about single issue groups? Probably because politicians fear them 
now more than before and thus allow them to play a larger role in 
our politics than before. And why should this be so? Simply 
because the parties are too weak to protect their members and thus 
to contain single issue politics. 
In earlier times single issue groups were under greater 
pressures to reach accommodations with the parties, After all, the 
parties nominated candidates, financed candidates, worked for 
candidates, and perhaps most importantly, party voting protected 
candidates, When a contemporary single issue group threatens to 
"get" an officeholder, the threat must be taken seriously. The 
group can go into his district, recruit a primary or general election 
challenger, or both, and bankroll that candidate. Even if the 
sentiment espoused by the group is not the majority sentiment of 
the district, few officeholders relish the thought of a strong, 
well-financed opponent. Things were different when strong parties 
existed. Party leaders controlled the nomination process and would 
fight to maintain that control. An outside challenge would typically 
serve to galvanize the party into action to protect its prerogatives. 
Only if a single issue group represented the dominant sentiment in 
a given area could it count on controlling the party organization 
itself, and thereby electoral politics in that area. 
Not only did the party organization have greater ability 
to resist single issue pressures at the electoral level, but the 
party in government had greater ability to control the agenda and 
thereby contain single issue pressures at the policymaking level. 
Today we seem condemned to go through an annual agony over federal 
abortion funding. There is little doubt that politicians on both 
sides would prefer to reach some reasonable compromise at the 
committee level and settle the issue. But in today's decentralized 
Congress there is no way to put the lid on. In contrast, historians 
tell us that in the late nineteenth century a large portion of the 
Republican constituency was far less interested in the tariff and 
other questions of national economic development than in whether 
German immigrants should be permitted to teach their native language 
in their local schools, and whether Catholics and "liturgical 
Protestants" should be permitted to consume alcohol.22 Interestingly, 
however, the national agenda of the period is devoid of such issues. 
And when they do show up on the state level, the exceptions prove 
the rule: they produce party splits and striking defeats for the 
party which allowed them to surface, 23
One can cite more recent examples as well. Prior to 1970 
popular connnentators frequently criticized the autocratic anti-
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majoritarian behavior of congressional connnittee chairmen in general, 
and of the entire Rules Committee in particular. It is certainly 
true that the seniority leadership killed many bills the rank and file 
might have passed if left to their own devices. But congressional 
scholars were always aware as well that the seniority leadership 
buried many bills that the rank and file wanted buried but lacked 
the political courage to bury themselves, In 1961 for example, the 
House Rules Connnittee was roundly condemned for killing a major 
federal aid to education bill over the question of extension of that 
aid to parochial schools. Contemporary accounts, however, suggest 
that congressmen regarded the action of the Rules Committee as a 
24 public service, Of course, control of the agenda is a two-edged 
sword (a point we return to below) , but present day connnentators 
on single issue groups clearly are concerned with too little control 
rather than too much, 
In sum, a strong party which is held accountable for the 
government of a nation state has both the ability and the incentive 
to contain particularistic pressures. It controls nominations, 
elections and the agenda, and it collectively realizes that small 
minorities are small minorities no matter how intense they are. 
But as the parties decline, they lose control over nominations and 
campaigns, they lose the loyalty of the voters, and they lose control 
of the agenda, Party officeholders cease to be held collectively 
accountable for party performance, but they become individually 
exposed to the political pressure of myriad interest groups. The 
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decline of party permits interest groups to wield greater influence, 
their success encourages the formation of still more interest groups, 
politics becomes increasingly fragmented, and collective 
responsibility becomes still more elusive. 
Popular Alienation from Government 
For at least a decade political analysts have pondered the 
significance of survey data indicative of a steady increase in the 
alienation of the American public from the political process. Table 
8 presents some representative data. As shown, two-thirds of the 
American public feels that the government is run for the benefit of 
big interests rather than for the people as a whole, three-quarters 
believe that government officials waste a lot of tax money, and half 
flatly agree with the statement that government officials are 
basically incompetent . The American public is in a nasty mood, a 
cynical, distrusting, and resentful mood, The question is why. 
[Table 8 here] 
Specific events and personalities clearly have some effect: 
we see pronounced "Watergate effects" between 1972 and 1976 in the 
table . But the trends clearly began much earlier . Indeed, the first 
political science studies analyzing the trends were based on data no 
later than 1972. 25 At the other extreme, it also appears that the
American data are only the strongest manifestation of a pattern 
evident in many democracies, perhaps for reasons common to all 
countries in the present era, perhaps not . I do think it probable, 
1964 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1978 
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Table 8 
Recent Trends in Political Alienation and Distrust 
Government Run For Government Officials Government Officials Don't 
Few Big Interests Waste "A Lot" Know What They're Doing 
29% 46 27 
39 57 36 
45 56 34 
66 74 49 
68 7 7  s o  
Source: National Election Studies made available by the InterUniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of 
Michigan. 
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however, that the trends thus far discussed in this article bear some 
relation to the popular mood in the United States. 
If the same national problems not only persist but worsen 
while ever greater amounts of revenue are directed at them, why 
shouldn't the typical citizen conclude that most of the money must be 
wasted by incompetent officials? If narrowly based interest groups 
increasingly affect our politics, why shouldn't citizens increasingly 
conclude that the interests run the government? For fifteen years 
the citizenry has listened to a steady stream of promises but has 
seen very little in the way of follow through. An increasing 
proportion of the electorate does not believe that elections make a 
difference, a fact which largely explains the much-discussed post-
1960 decline in voting turnout. 26
Continued public disillusionment with the political process 
poses several real dangers , For one thing disillusionment begets 
further disillusionment. Leadership becomes more difficult if 
citizens do not trust their leaders and will not give the benefit of 
a doubt. Policy failure becomes more likely if citizens expect the 
policy to fail. Waste increases and government competence decreases 
as citizen disrespect for politics encourages a lesser breed of 
person to make careers in government. And "government by a few big 
interests" becomes more than a cliche if citizens increasingly decide 
the cliche is true, and cease participating for that reason. 
Finally there is the real danger that continued disappoint­
ment with particular government officials ultimately metamorphoses 
into disillusionment with government per se , Increasing numbers of 
citizens believe that government is not simply over-extended, but 
perhaps incapable of any further bettering of the world. Yes, 
government is over-extended, inefficiency is pervasive, and 
ineffectiveness is all too common. But government is one of the 
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few instruments of collective action we have, and even those committed 
to selective pruning of government programs can not blithely allow 
the concept of an activist government to fall into disrepute , 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of democracy does not submit to precise 
definition, a claim supported by the existence of numerous non-
identical definitions , To most people democracy embodies a number 
of valued qualities, Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe 
that all such valued qualities are mutually compatible. At the least, 
maximizing the attainment of one quality may require accepting 
middling levels of another. 
Recent American political thought has emphasized government 
of the people and E_y_ the people. Attempts have been made to insure 
that all preferences receive a hearing, especially through direct 
expression of those preferences, but if not, at least through 
faithful representation, Citizen participation is the reigning 
value, and arrangements which foster widespread participation are 
much in favor. 
Of late, however, some political commentators have begun 
to wonder whether contemporary thought places sufficient emphasis 
on government for the people , In placing so much stress on 
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participation, have we lost sight of accountability? Surely we should 
be as concerned with what government produces as with how many 
participate . What good is participation if the citizenry is unable 
27to determine who merits their support? 
Participation and re$ponsibility are not logically 
incompatible, but there is a degree of tension between the two, and 
the quest for either may be carried to extremes, Participation 
maximizers find themselves involved with quotas and virtual represen-
tation schemes, while responsibility maximizers can find themselves 
28 with a closed shop under boss rule , Moreover, both qualities can 
weaken the democracy they supposedly underpin . Unfettered 
participation produces Hyde Amendments and immobilism. Responsible 
parties can use agenda power to thwart democratic decision--for more 
than a century the Democratic party used what control it had to 
suppress the racial issue , Neither participation nor responsibility 
should be pursued at the expense of all other values, but that is 
what has happened with participation over the course of the past two 
decades, and we now reap the consequences in our politics. 
In 1970 journalist David Broder wrote 
• , what we have is a society in which discontent, 
disbelief, cynicism and political inertia characterize the 
public mood; a country whose economy suffers from severe 
dislocations, whose currency is endangered, where unem­
ployment and inflation coexist, where increasing numbers 
of people and even giant enterprises live on the public 
dol e ;  a country whose two races continue to withdraw from 
each other in growing physical and social isolation; a 
country whose major public institutions command steadily 
less allegiance from its citizens; whose education, 
transportation, law enforcement, health and sanitation 
systems fall far short of filling their functions; a 
country whose largest city is close to being ungovernable 
and uninhabitable; and a country still far from reconciling 
its international responsibilities with its unmet domestic 
needs. 
We are in trouble. 29 
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Broder is not a Cassandra, and he was writing before FECA, before the 
OPEC embargo, before Watergate, and before Jimmy Carter . If he was 
correct that we were in trouble then, what about now? 
The depressing thing is that no rays of light shine 
through the dark clouds . The trends which underlie the decline of 
parties continue unabated, and the kinds of structural reforms which 
might override those trends are too sweeping and/or outlandish to 
30 stand any chance of adoption , Through a complex mixture of 
accident and intention we have constructed
.
for ourselves a system 
which articulates interests superbly but aggregates them poorly. We 
hold our politicians individually accountable for the proposals they 
advocate, but less so for the adoption of those proposals, and not 
at all for overseeing the implementation of those proposals and the 
evaluation of their results. In contemporary America officials do 
not govern, they merely posture. 
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such as Woodrow Wilson and A. Lawrence Lowell . It enjoyed a 
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E . E. Schattschneider . For a thorough exigensrs · of the party 
responsibility argument, see Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of 
Responsible Party Government (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1962) , 
3 .  During the postwar period the national government has experienced 
divided party control about half the time. In the preceding half 
century only six years of divided control show up. 
4. At this point skeptics invariably ask "What about Warren G .  
Harding?" The statement i n  the text is meant to express a 
tendency . Certainly in the first sixty years of this century we 
did not see a string of candidates comparable to the products of 
the amateur politics of the past fourteen years (Goldwater, 
McGovern, Carter, Reagan) . 
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30 . For example, party cohesion would no doubt be strenghtened by 
revising existing statutes to prevent split ticket voting and 
to permit campaign contributions only to parties . At the 
constitutional level, giving the President the power of 
dissolution, and replacing the single-member district system 
with proportional representation would probably unify the party 
in government much more than presently . Obviously, changes 
such as these not only are highly improbable, but also 
exceedingly risky, since we can not accurately predict the 
unintended consequences which surely would accompany them. 
